

Castro Shifts Missiles To West End of (Cuba)

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY

Star Staff Writer

The government of Fidel Castro, for reasons that are unclear to U.S. officials, recently finished removing all of its anti-aircraft missile batteries from eastern Cuba.

American U2 jets, which have maintained a regular surveillance of Cuba since the 1962 missile crisis, began detecting the shift in SAM sites from Oriente and the eastern provinces a year ago. Indications are that Castro's anti-aircraft missile strength is now concentrated in the western half of the island where Havana is located.

Officials of U.S. departments that keep watch on Cuban military and political developments are unable to explain why Castro has elected to leave Santiago and the eastern areas undefended.

Some speculate that Castro does not anticipate any attack from the U.S. at all. Others say he may not have enough missiles to defend all of the island and is simply concentrating what he does have in the west.

It was U-2 photo reconnaissance that first detected the ICBM buildup which led to the

1962 confrontation and subsequent Soviet removal of missiles that could have reached almost every American city.

There is no longer any question that Russian submarine crews intend to use the Cuban harbor at Cienfuegos as a regular port and for recreational facilities. Cienfuegos is still regarded by the United States as a facility rather than a base, in the full military sense, for submarine use.

Up to now, the Russians have not sent a Polaris-class submarine to the harbor. The most recent visitor was a nuclear-powered attack submarine armed with torpedoes rather than ballistic missiles.

The United States tracked the sub there during the last three weeks and at last report it was still in the harbor, lying alongside a Soviet tender. Two barges and several barracks now appear to be permanent installations at Cienfuegos.

Castro also has tightened the defense ring around the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay on the eastern tip of Cuba. However, it appears that the ring is more devoted to keeping Cubans seeking asylum at the U.S. base than to protect against American attack.

PRESIDENT TERMS CUBA OFF LIMITS FOR SOVIET SUBS

Says Use of Isle by 'Nuclear'
Craft Would Violate Pact
Reached Last October

DOUBTS SECOND CRISIS

Nixon Warns of Resumption
of Bombing if Hanoi Builds
Up Its Forces in South

By MAX FRANKEL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 4—President Nixon said tonight that he would regard the servicing of Soviet "nuclear" submarines "either in Cuba or from Cuba" as a violation of a new understanding obtained from Moscow last October.

Speaking out for the first time on a subject that he had hitherto treated as too delicate and confidential, the President said that he believed the Russians did not want a second crisis over Cuba.

For that reason, he added, "I don't believe that one is going to occur, particularly since the understanding has been so clearly laid out and has been so clearly relied on by us."

Mr. Nixon did not explain the circumstances or detail of the agreement. He said it was obtained Oct. 11, which was two days before the Soviet Union issued a public statement on Cuba offering not so much a new agreement as reassurance that it was doing nothing to "contradict" a 1962 agreement that concluded the first Cuban crisis over missiles.

Expanded Agreement

The President stated clearly this evening, however, that this understanding had been "expanded"

barring offensive missiles to include a Soviet pledge not to put a military naval base in Cuba. Mr. Nixon's further statement that submarines could not therefore be serviced in or from Cuba appeared to be his own definition of what was meant by a naval base.

In a 20-minute discussion of foreign affairs during a one-hour television conversation in the White House with four network correspondents, Mr. Nixon also made these other major points:

"We now see the end of Americans' combat role in Vietnam in sight." Mr. Nixon presumably meant ground combat and implied that the end would come before 1972. He did not say anything further, however, about troop withdrawals beyond the reduction to 280,000 scheduled for May 1.

He did not wish to resume the bombing of North Vietnam but was reiterating his own and admittedly new "understanding" that he would order the bombing of key areas if Hanoi expanded its infiltration of the south at a time when Americans were moving out. Such a move would be essential to protect American lives, Mr. Nixon said, acknowledging for the first time that punishment for

such a build-up and not merely retaliation for the loss of reconnaissance planes was the motive of a air strike against the north last November.

Any promise or formal commitment to intervene to prevent the destruction of Israel "would only tend to inflame the situation" in the Middle East. But Israel and her Arab

neighbors know how much help the United States is providing. They also know, Mr. Nixon said, that Israel will continue to receive the arms needed to defend herself against the superior manpower of her neighbors and Soviet forces in the region. This is a time for private negotiations on the Middle East, he added, saying that peace depended upon the Soviet Union's readiness to play

a "conciliatory, peace-making role."

A basic disagreement about the definition of strategic weapons will prevent a comprehensive agreement to limit those weapons, but a limited agreement should be possible "eventually," Mr. Nixon praised a recent Soviet decision to limit the deployment of the S-9 and other big missiles and said that he sensed an overwhelming common interest by the two powers to avoid a nuclear competition and "the escalating burden of arms."

The election in Chile of a Marxist Government, with major Communist support, was "not something that we welcomed," but relations with that country will remain cordial so long as Chile's foreign policy is not "antagonistic to our interests." In his first public comment on the election of Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, which is known to have deeply disturbed him, Mr. Nixon said that United States intervention in a free election would have disrupted relations with the rest of the hemisphere and been "far worse." He said that he would continue to watch foreign policy developments in Santiago and said that he had not "given up on Chile or on the Chilean people" and would The concern last fall about a Soviet naval base in Cuba was exacerbated by fear of events in Chile and a suspicion that Moscow was trying to capitalize on the election with a new show of military strength to propel developments in its favor throughout Latin America. In September, after watching the construction of some port facilities in Cienfuegos, in central Cuba, and the arrival of two service barges and a submarine tender, Henry A. Kissinger, the President's foreign affairs aide, recalled the agreement by which the United States promised not to invade Cuba in return for a Soviet pledge never again to introduce offensive strategic weapons on to the island. He said Washington would take a most serious view of the establishment of a naval base in Cuba. In the maneuvering that followed, including some direct conversations between Mr. Kissinger and Soviet diplomats, the Russians were said to have agreed to an "understanding" that minimized the sense of crisis. Yet the shore facilities and the barges remained in Cienfuegos and the tender has continued to cruise in Caribbean waters.

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White House Stand On Soviet Tenders Off Cuba Clarified

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 5—The White House emphasized today that President Nixon would consider it a violation of an understanding with the Soviet Union if her nuclear submarines were serviced "anywhere at sea" by submarine tenders operating from Cuba.

An aide to Henry A. Kissinger, assistant to the President for national security affairs, clarified the White House attitude after Ronald L. Ziegler, the President's press secretary, told reporters the understanding ruled out servicing of submarines "in the immediate area of the Caribbean."

The aide said that Mr. Ziegler had realized his remark was too limited geographically and had telephoned from the plane as the President flew to San Clemente, Calif., to ask that the matter be clarified.

The issue arose Mr. Ziegler was asked what the President had meant when he told four network television commentators in their interview last night that it would be a violation to service a submarine "either in Cuba or from Cuba."

Mr. Ziegler said the President was not specifying any geographic limit, but, urged to identify a boundary outside a Cuban harbor, he said that Soviet submarines "with offensive capabilities" should not be serviced "in the immediate area of the Caribbean."

The aide said later that Mr. Ziegler had drawn "a tighter line than we would have liked."

Mr. Ziegler cleared up some confusion as to the date the Soviet Union pledged not to install a military or naval base in Cuba. The President said last night that the pledge was made on Oct. 11, but Mr. Ziegler said he had meant to say Oct. 13, the date that the Soviet Union issued a public statement on Cuba.

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Russian Sub Tender That Stirred Capital Quits Cuban Waters

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 8—Four Soviet naval vessels, including a submarine tender whose arrival at Cienfuegos, Cuba, alarmed official Washington last fall, have reportedly left Cuba, apparently on their way home.

The tender and a diesel-powered submarine were reported in the mid-Atlantic today moving northeast, while a guided-missile frigate and an oiler were in the English Channel, having left Cuba earlier this week, Jerry W. Friedheim, a Defense Department spokesman, announced.

Two Soviet barges and a tug that arrived in Cuba last September, remained at Cienfuegos, he added.

The importance of the tender, a 9,000-ton vessel, is that she is presumably equipped to service Soviet nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines with spare parts and repairs.

Pentagon officials said privately that the tender's departure, along with the other vessels, might signify that the basis was disappearing for fear that the Soviet Union might be

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establishing a base for nuclear submarines in Cuba.

They refrained, however, from drawing any conclusions. The State Department declined comment, saying that it was leaving the subject entirely to the Pentagon.

Mr. Friedheim conceded that there had been a delay in making public the departure of the Soviet vessels from Cuba but declined to explain it. It seemed likely that Pentagon officials wanted to be quite sure the ships really were going home, and not just "harbor-hopping," as Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird put it recently.

Soviet tactics in recent months in the Caribbean, where they have moved ships in and out of Cuban ports in what seemed an arbitrary fashion, have been interpreted by some observers as an assertion of the Soviet right to have ships there, and a test of United States determination to prevent establishment of a submarine base in Cuba.

The submarine tender that

disturbed United States officials arrived at Cienfuegos on Sept. 25.

Previously two Soviet barges of a type that could be used for storing radioactive waste had arrived at Cienfuegos, where the Russians, or the Cubans, have constructed two barracks, each capable of accommodating about 100 men, plus a football field and a communications center.

This information and subsequent reports of the comings and goings of the Soviet vessels were obtained mainly from U-2 reconnaissance flights, according to the Pentagon.

On Sept. 25, the day the tender arrived, a White House spokesman said:

"The Soviet Union can be under no doubt that we would view the establishment of a strategic base in the Caribbean with the utmost seriousness."

The spokesman later said that the same view applied to "servicing of Soviet vessels armed with offensive weapons in or from bases in Cuba." The word "bases" was understood to include tenders in the Caribbean.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Jan. 18, 1971 **B7**

6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA

By Jack Anderson

Locked in the darkest recesses of the Central Intelligence Agency is the story of six assassination attempts against Cuba's Fidel Castro.

For 10 years, only a few key people have known the terrible secret. They have sworn never to talk. Yet we have learned the details from sources whose credentials are beyond question.

We spoke to John McCone, who headed the CIA at the time of the assassination attempts. He acknowledged the idea had been discussed inside the CIA but insisted it had been "rejected immediately." He vigorously denied that the CIA had ever participated in any plot on Castro's life. Asked whether the attempts could have been made with his knowledge, he replied: "It could not have happened."

We have complete confidence, however, in our sources.

The plot to knock off Castro began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dicta-

tor before the motley invaders landed on the island. Their arrival was expected to touch off a general uprising, which the Communist militia would have had more trouble putting down without the charismatic Castro to lead them.

After the first attempt failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba. The last team reportedly made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before they were apprehended. This happened around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who previously had agitated for Castro in New Orleans and had made a mysterious trip to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retal-

iate against President Kennedy.

To set up the Castro assassination, the CIA enlisted Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent with shadowy contacts, who had handled other undercover assignments for the CIA out of his Washington public relations office. He later moved to Las Vegas to head up billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban underworlds, to arrange the assassination. The dapper, hawk-faced Roselli, formerly married to movie actress June Lang, was a power in the movie industry until his conviction with racketeer Willie Bioff in a million-dollar Hollywood labor shakedown. The CIA assigned two of its most trusted operatives, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell, to the hush-hush murder mission. Using phony names, they accompanied Roselli on trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams.

The full story reads like the script of a James Bond movie,

complete with secret trysts at glittering Miami Beach hotels and midnight powerboat dashes to secret landing spots on the Cuban coast. Once, Roselli's boat was shot out from under him.

For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ailment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fontainebleau Hotel.

A couple of weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out, a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered before the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life,

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

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Castro Plot Raises Ugly Questions

By Jack Anderson

The plot to kill Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, hidden for 10 years from the public, raises some ugly questions that high officials would rather keep buried deep inside the Central Intelligence Agency.

1. Has the CIA tried to assassinate any other leaders? John McCone, who headed the CIA during the six attempts to knock off Castro, denied emphatically that the CIA has tried to kill anyone. But ex-Sen. George Smathers, one of John F. Kennedy's closest friends, told us the late President suspected that the CIA had arranged the shootings of the Dominican Republic's Rafael Trujillo in 1961 and South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963.

2. Did President Kennedy personally sanction the plot against Castro? The preparations to assassinate the Cuban dictator began during the last months of the Eisenhower administration as part of the Bay of Pigs scheme. All six attempts, however, were made during 1961-63 when Mr. Kennedy occupied the White House. Smathers told us he once spoke to the late President about assassinating Castro. Mr. Kennedy merely rolled back his eyes, recalled Smathers, as if to indicate the idea was too wild to discuss. Subsequently, Mr. Kennedy told Smathers of his suspicion that the CIA may have been

behind the Trujillo and Diem assassinations.

3. Did the late Robert Kennedy know about the assassination attempts? After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy swore to friends he would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds." He put his brother, Robert, in charge of the CIA with instructions to shake it up. The CIA made five attempts on Castro's life after the Bay of Pigs while Robert Kennedy was riding herd on the agency.

4. Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? The late President was murdered nine months after the last assassination team was caught on a Havana rooftop with high-powered rifles. Presumably, they were subjected to fiendish tortures until they told all they knew. None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings.

PLOT BACKFIRE?

Former associates recall that Robert Kennedy, deeply despondent, went into semi-seclusion after his brother's assassination. Could he have been tormented by more than natural grief? He certainly learned that the assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had been active in the pro-Castro move-

ment and had traveled to Mexico to visit the Cuban Embassy a few weeks before the dreadful day in Dallas. Could Bob Kennedy have been plagued by the terrible thought that the CIA plot, which he must at least have condoned, put into motion forces that may have brought about his brother's martyrdom?

The last surviving brother, Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass), could give us no insight. His brothers had never spoken to him about any assassination attempts against Castro, he said. He was aware, he volunteered, only that Sen. Smathers had talked to the late President about eliminating Castro.

Smathers told us that President Kennedy seemed "horried" at the idea of political assassinations. "I remember him saying," recalled Smathers, "that the CIA frequently did things he didn't know about, and he was unhappy about it. He complained that the CIA was almost autonomous."

"He told me he believed the CIA had arranged to have Diem and Trujillo bumped off. He was pretty well shocked about that. He thought it was a stupid thing to do, and he wanted to get control of what the CIA was doing."

But McCone, disagreeing vigorously, told us that "no plot was authorized or implemented" to assassinate Castro, Trujillo, Diem or anyone else. "During those days of ten-

sion, there was a wide spectrum of plans ranging from one extreme to another," McCone admitted. "Whenever this subject (assassinating Castro) was brought up—and it was—it was rejected immediately on two grounds. First, it would not be condoned by anybody. Second, it wouldn't have achieved anything."

There was also talk in high places, McCone acknowledged, of supporting a coup to oust Diem. The former CIA director said he had argued against this at a secret session with both Kennedy brothers. He had contended that there was no one strong enough to take Diem's place and that a coup, therefore, would bring "political upheaval."

"I told the President and Bobby together," recalled McCone, "that if I were running a baseball team and had only one pitcher, I wouldn't take him out of the game."

The November, 1963, coup caught the United States completely by surprise, he said. While the plotters were moving on the palace, he said, then-Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was visiting Diem. Adm. Ulysses Sharp, then our Pacific commander, had also been present, but had left early to go to the airport.

McCone said President Diem escaped through a tunnel but was caught in nearby Cholon and "shot in a station wagon."

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